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1. Introduction 
 
In  spite  of  Jensen’s  (1989)  prediction  that  the  (widely-held)  public  corporation  would 
eclipse  due  to  large  agency  costs  resulting  from  the  lack  of  emphasis  on  value  creation  by 
insufficiently monitored managers, this type of corporation survived quite well. Indeed, during the 
1990s the public corporation even gained investors’ interest and, in Continental European listed 
firms  the  level  of  liquidity  increased  at  the  expense  of  the  high  control  levels  of  majority 
shareholders  (Becht  and  Mayer,  2001).  Several  reasons  for  the  preservation  of  the  public 
corporation  are  brought  forward.  First,  the  deficiencies  of  widely-held  public  corporations  – 
‘strong  managers,  weak  owners’,  in  the  words  of  Roe  (1994)  –  are  not  that  prominent  in  a 
corporate governance regime which provides strong protection of shareholder rights. La Porta et 
al.  (1999,  2000)  show  that  shareholder  rights  are  best  upheld  in  the  Anglo-American  legal 
tradition. Second, the importance of the widely-held public corporation in the US and the UK is 
the  consequence  of a  path-dependent  process wherein existing  corporate  ownership  structures 
influence legislation and vice versa (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Third, the agency costs mentioned 
by  Jensen  have  been  restrained  by  mechanisms  aligning  the  interests  of  managers  and 
shareholders.  It  is  the  efficiency  of  these  alignment  mechanisms,  namely  performance-related 
managerial remuneration and removal, that this paper is addresses.  
 
The delegation of tasks by the principal (owner) to the agent (executive team), resulting 
from the separation of ownership and control, necessitates governance mechanisms aligning the 
interests of principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The managerial labor market plays a 
prominent  role  in  this  process  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).  Shareholders'   interests  can  be 
protected  because  managerial  incentives  can  be  (re)structured  such  that  managers  avoid  poor 
performance due to the threat of dismissal and seek to reach high performance as a result of the 
rewarding and incentive effects of compensation contracts. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that 
the probability of CEO dismissal is too low to align effectively the interests of managers and 
owners.  Likewise,  performance-sensitive  managerial  compensation  schemes  in  isolation  only 
address agency problems at average or high levels of performance. Management may be not be 
induced  to  generate  further  effort  when  it  realizes  that  the  minimal  performance  thresholds 
triggering bonuses are out of reach.  
 
This paper contributes to the agency literature in the following ways. First, although a 
large  body  of  literature  exists  (especially  for  the  US)  on  both  managerial  disciplining  and 
managerial compensation, these two aspects of the managerial labor market are usually - with the 
notable exception of Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) - treated separately. This paper analyses both 
incentive  mechanisms  simultaneously  for  a  sample  of  UK  firms.  Second,  this  simultaneous 
treatment  is  econometrically  translated  into  a  sample  selection  technique  estimated  by  type-2 
Tobit models which mitigates the sample selection biases affecting many of the studies analyzing 
managerial  compensation.  We  also  deal  with  the  frequently  ignored  endogeneity  problems  in   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    3 
   
corporate finance research (see e.g. Himmelberg  et  al.,  1999) by using instrumental  variables 
estimation techniques. Third, the paper contributes to the research on the (relative) efficiency of 
various  governance  mechanisms.  Our  models  include  the  impact  of  a  set  of  governance 
mechanisms  on  turnover  and  the  use  of  compensation:  e.g.  control  concentration  by  type  of 
shareholder, the market for share blocks, the structure of the internal control mechanism (board of 
directors) and leverage (as a bonding mechanism).  
We analyze a randomly drawn sample of listed UK firms. Our period of analysis, 1988-
1993, was chosen for two reasons: (i) it coincides with a recession which makes performance-
induced turnover and compensation more interesting a topic and (ii) it is prior to the publication of 
the Cadbury report’s recommendations for good corporate governance which were mandatory for 
all listed companies on the London Stock Exchange since the end of 1993.   
 
We  obtain  the  following  interesting  results:  (a)  Both  the  CEOs’  industry-adjusted 
monetary compensation and their replacement are strongly performance-sensitive. Top executive 
turnover is shown to serve as a disciplinary mechanism for corporate underperformance, whereas 
the  level  of  monetary  compensation  rewards  good  performance.  (b)  Neither  total  ownership 
concentration nor the presence of large blockholdings held by outsider shareholders (institutions, 
families or individuals, other corporations) is related to higher board turnover even in the wake of 
poor performance. This implies that there is little evidence of shareholder monitoring. (c) CEOs 
with strong voting power successfully impede replacement irrespective of corporate performance. 
This case of strong managerial entrenchment is even exacerbated when the CEO also holds the 
position of chairman of the board. (d) Boards with a high proportion of non-executive directors 
replace the CEO more frequently, but these boards are not more apt to replace underperforming 
management. (e) There is also little consistent evidence that the market in large ownership stakes 
influences CEO turnover. (f) We find that CEO monetary compensation is not only related to 
corporate  size  and  risk  but  is  also  positively  related  to  both  accounting  and  stock  price 
performance. In firms with large outside shareholding, CEO compensation is lower but outside 
shareholder do not impose a stricter performance-related incentive remuneration scheme. When 
insiders have strong voting power, the CEOs remuneration is lower except when the stock price 
performance is poor: it seems that when the CEOs wealth resulting from their investment goes 
down due to decreasing stock prices, the CEOs cash compensation is higher. (g) The presence of a 
remuneration committee has no impact on remuneration. (h) Following CEO dismissal, there is 
little evidence of short-run improvement of corporate performance. (i) We find strong support for 
the incentive effect of remuneration: CEOs with higher levels of monetary compensation (salary 
and  bonus)  attain  better  subsequent  accounting  and  stock  price-based  measures  of  corporate 
performance.    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    4 
   
 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  the  research 
hypotheses  are  motivated.  Section  3  discusses  the  sample  selection  procedure,  describes  the 
variables and reveals the data sources. In the same section, the different estimation techniques are 
explained. Section 4 presents the results while Section 5 discusses detailed robustness tests. The 
conclusions are presented in Section 6.  
 
 
2. Determinants of CEO compensation and of managerial turnover  
 
2.1. Background agency literature   
 Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) were the first to document that the likelihood of forced 
turnover is a decreasing function of corporate performance; a finding further corroborated by a.o. 
Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Denis and Denis (1995), and Franks et al. (2001). The 
disciplinary character of managerial turnover is influenced by board size (Yermack, 1996), board 
composition (Weisbach, 1988), ownership structure (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Denis et al., 
1997), and is industry-dependent (Parrino, 1997). Forced executive resignations in the US are 
accompanied  by  positive  and  statistically  significant  abnormal  stock  performance  (Denis  and 
Denis,  1995)  provided  that  an  outsider  is  appointed  as  CEO  (Borokhovich  et  al.,  1996  and 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). Finally, CEO turnover is the ultimate element of an ’error-correcting 
process’, for it affects firm’s investment decisions, giving a stimuli to divest poorly performing 
acquisitions (Weisbach, 1995).   
 
The theoretical blueprint of pay-for-performance remuneration were laid by the principal-
agent models of Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). A multi-period setting has 
enabled the analysis of career concerns that also affect executive compensation contracts (Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992). Following Holmström (1982a), it is relative rather than absolute performance 
that is shown to be a valid determinant of CEO remuneration (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990)
1. 
Performance-sensitivity  of  managerial  compensation  is  empirically  well  documented  (e.g. 
Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Executive pay depends on both past 
stock  returns  and  past accounting  measures  (Sloan,  1993) as  well as  on  relative  measures  of 
performance (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). Still, the level of executive compensation depends not 
only on past performance: more important are company size (Murphy, 1985) and CEO age and 
tenure (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Murphy, 1986). Furthermore, the following characteristics 
also explain part of the changes in remuneration: ownership structure (Core et al., 1999), board 
composition  (Hallock,  1997),  threat  of  takeover  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1998),  merger  and 
acquisition  policy  (Girma  et  al.,  2002),  company  risk,  growth  opportunities,  dividend  policy 
(Lewellen et al., 1987), and the country where the company is operating (Conyon and Murphy, 
                                                 
1 Similar arguments are made in the so-called tournament models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    5 
   
2000). The optimal balance of stock- and cash-based compensation solves a trade-off between 
short- and long-term incentives (Narayanan, 1996). While cash compensation creates short-term 
incentives  (and  therefore  mitigates  long-run  overinvestment),  stock-based  compensation  may 
provide  appropriate  incentives  and  reduce  long-term  underinvestment  problems  (Dechow  and 
Sloan,  1991).  Finally,  Kole  (1997)  argues  that  optimality  of  a  given  compensation  structure 
crucially depends on the characteristics of the assets managed by a given CEO.  
 
2.2. Motivation of hypotheses 
The importance of the disciplining role of managerial dismissals is widely accepted. Still, 
setting  a  correct  performance  yardstick  is  problematic  as  both  accounting  and  stock  price 
performance have deficiencies. Accounting information records only past corporate performance 
and  can  be  manipulated  over  a  period  of  several  years  by  top  management.  Stock  price 
performance captures the firm’s ability to generate value in the future and may hence already 
include the effects of an expected change  in CEO. Therefore, we argue that  both stock- and 
accounting-based  measures  of  performance  provide  incremental  information  about  executives’ 
productivity.  
 
Hypothesis  1  (Disciplinary  role  of  managerial  turnover):  Poor  accounting  and  past  stock 
market-based performance positively affect the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
   
Managerial  compensation  schemes  may  be  an  appropriate  device  complementing 
performance-related turnover for the following reasons. First, many managers can be subjected to 
this incentive mechanism, while performance-induced disciplinary turnover only affects a few top 
managers.  Second,  Chang  (1995)  argues  that  for  industries  where  industry-specific  skills  are 
required, performance-based compensation is likely to be a more effective solution to agency 
problems than the threat of dismissal. Third, as disciplinary turnover penalizes underperformance, 
the mere fact of being able to avoid poor performance (and, hence dismissal) does not constitute 
the right incentive for well-performing managers to pursue a value-maximizing strategy. If higher 
managerial effort induces better corporate performance, there is an important rewarding role for 
performance-dependent bonus and option schemes
2. Imperfect observability of top management’s 
actions creates opportunities for moral hazard that adversely affect the contracting with a manager 
(Holmström, 1979). The efficiency of contracting can be improved by using informative signals 
about executive' s effort. Following this argumentation, Bushman and Indjejikan (1993) and Kim 
and Sloan (1993) develop models in which the CEO’s compensation depends on both accounting- 
and  stock-based  performance  measures.  Both  indicators  are  considered  noisy  signals  of 
managerial effort, but as long as they are incrementally informative about managerial actions, they 
                                                 
2 Pay-for-performance compensation schemes may also have a punishing role provided that the bonus is forgone in 
case of poor performance and the base salary is scaled down. Although such a contract could achieve both the goals of 
disciplining  and  rewarding  simultaneously,  it  is  not  observed  empirically.  Gregg  et  al.  (1993)  document  that 
managerial compensation tends to increase over time, even in periods of bad performance.    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    6 
   
enter a performance-dependent wage formula with non-zero weight
3. They argue that constructing 
employment contracts dependent on both stock returns and accounting measures of performance 
shields the CEO from market-wide changes and thus improves contracting efficiency.  
 
Hypothesis  2  (Rewarding  effect  of  compensation):  Past  performance  (both  in  terms  of 
accounting-based and stock market-based measures) positively influences the level of the CEOs 
monetary compensation.   
 
The essence of the agency literature is that in order to induce agents to exert (costly) effort, 
the principal has to provide them with appropriate incentives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest 
(partial) equity ownership by managers as a way of mitigating this problem, but Murphy (1986) 
finds only little empirical support for this mechanism. Fama (1980) discounts the idea of pay-for-
performance contracts for managers with short track records because, if managers believe that 
subsequent wage offers will depend on current levels of performance, they will work hard today to 
build  up  reputational  value  independent  of  incentive  compensation
4.  Holmström  (1982b) 
challenges  this  idea  and  shows  that  although  the  effects  of  labor-market  discipline  can  be 
substantial, it is not a perfect substitute for contracts
5. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) extend the 
Holmström  model  by  introducing  Fama’s  reputation  concept  and  show  that  the  optimal 
compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from 
career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract.  
 
Hypothesis  3  (Incentive  effect  of  compensation):  High  levels  of  the  CEO’s  monetary 
compensation induce better corporate performance in subsequent periods. 
 
Decisions about hiring and firing top management as well as about the remuneration are 
ultimately taken by the board of directors. The higher the degree of independence of the board 
from top management, the higher is the level of performance-induced turnover. Still, the empirical 
US  literature  comes  up  with  conflicting  results.  Weisbach  (1988)  shows  that  board  structure 
affects the likelihood of disciplinary turnover: poorly performing CEOs are more frequently fired 
provided that the board is outsider-dominated. This conclusion is challenged by Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) who show that managerial turnover is unrelated to 
board composition. Instead, turnover seems to result mainly from the pressure of the takeover 
market (Martin and McConnell, 1991). For the UK, Franks et al. (2001) do not find that a high 
proportion  of  independent  directors  leads  to  stronger  managerial  disciplining  in  the  poorly 
                                                 
3 This argument of using both types of performance measures (stock- and accounting-based) as determinants of CEO 
compensation is also included in the recent empirical literature for US firms (Core et al., 1999; John and Senbet, 
1998; Mehran, 1995).   
4 There is some evidence that the managerial labor market and hence managerial reputation plays an important role. 
Top  managers  leading  poorly  performing  firms  will  be  offered  fewer  non-executive  directorships  (Kaplan  and 
Reishus, 1990).  
5 In the absence of contracts, managers are expected to work too hard in their early years (when market is still 
assessing the manager’s ability) and not hard enough in later years.   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    7 
   
performing firms. What does seem to matter is separating the functions of CEO and chairman of 
the board.  
 For the US, there is ample evidence that forced turnover follows from monitoring by large 
(activist) block holders and by the external control market (e.g. Denis and Denis, 1995; Bethel et 
al., 1998). For UK firms, Franks et al. (2001) confirm that these mechanisms also play a leading 
role in managerial replacement. 
 
Hypothesis  4a  (Governance  effects  on  turnover):  Ownership  concentration  as  well  as 
independent boards of directors positively affect the likelihood of managerial turnover in poorly-
performing firms. 
 
There is little empirical research on the relation between governance mechanisms and CEO 
employment/remuneration contracts. Still, the degree of independence of the board of directors 
may have a direct impact on managerial compensation as it is the non-executive directors (or their 
representatives in a remuneration committee) who set the remuneration contracts. In addition, 
shareholders will monitor the firm when their share stakes are sufficiently large such that the 
benefits from monitoring exceed the costs (Admati et al., 1994; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 
1998) and may set the terms of CEO employment contracts. Core et al. (1999) and Crespi et al. 
(2002) illustrate that the ownership structure influences the level of managerial compensation.  
 
Hypothesis  4b  (Governance  effects  on  compensation):  Ownership  concentration  as  well  as 
independent  boards  of  directors  positively  affect  the  level  of  performance-based  cash 
compensation of the CEO. 
 
The intensity of monitoring may not only depend on mere ownership concentration but 
also  on  the  type  of  blockholders.  In  particular,  substantial  insider  ownership  may  lead  to 
managerial entrenchment, which decreases the performance-sensitivity of managerial turnover and 
reduces the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Denis et al., 1997). Outsider 
blockholders may hold management responsible for poor  performance and attempt to remove 
them.  Even  across  different  types  of  outsider  shareholders  (institutions,  families  or  industrial 
firms), the incentives to monitor may differ. Institutions may be passive shareholders in order not 
to reduce the liquidity of their investment portfolios as a result of insider trading legislation. Other 
outside shareholders may not be hindered by such constraints. It is also likely that the decision 
criteria to remove underperforming management may depend on the type of owner. For example, 
a reduction in share value or negative abnormal returns may trigger intensified monitoring by 
outside shareholders and increase top management dismissal. In firms with diffuse ownership, in 
contrast, substitution  of  top  management  may  only  take  place  (too)  late  due  to  lack  of  large 
shareholder monitoring and may happen after a substantial decrease in corporate performance, like 
negative accounting earnings.  
     Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    8 
   
Hypothesis 5a (Blockholder identity effect on turnover): The type of controlling shareholders 
affects the likelihood of managerial turnover: monitoring by outsider blockholders (institutions, 
families and individuals, industrial firms or the government) leads to increased performance-
related  CEO  removal  whereas  insider  blockholders  impede  executive  board  changes. 
Furthermore,  the  decision  criterion  of  CEO  dismissal  is  related  to  the  type  of  controlling 
blockholder: in companies with monitoring outside shareholders, the CEO is replaced after poor 
stock price performance, whereas in widely-held firms or firms with strong insider ownership the 
decision criterion is based on negative accounting results. 
 
A  similar  argument  applies  to  the  pay-for-performance  schemes  of  top  management.  
Managers with a high level of decision discretion (resulting from diffuse ownership and weak 
boards)  may  set  their  own  pay  and  performance  criteria.  In  these  cases,  we  expect  pay-for-
earnings performance contracts to be more prominent as top management can to some extent 
influence  accounting  policies.  In  firms  with  high  outsider  control  concentration,  the  value 
maximization  criterion  may  be  translated  into  pay-for-share  price  performance  remuneration 
schemes. Core et al. (1999) find that both size of the CEO equity stake and presence of outside 
block holdings are significant determinants of executive pay in the US. Clay (2000) argues that 
monitoring activities are delegated to some classes of owners (namely financial institutions) and 
that  the  presence  of  activist  shareholders  leads  to  higher  levels  of  CEO  compensation, 
simultaneously increasing performance-sensitivity. 
 
Hypothesis 5b (Blockholder identity effect on compensation): In firms with a diffuse ownership 
structure  or  strong  concentration  of  insider  control,  pay-for-accounting  performance 
remuneration contracts prevail whereas in outsider shareholder-controlled firms pay-for-share 
price performance compensation contracts are imposed. 
     
  Denis  and  Sarin  (1999)  and  Denis  and  Kruse  (2000)  show  that  changes  in  ownership 
structure  imply  adjustments  in  board  composition,  and  consequently  result  in  changes  in  the 
management team. This tends to indicate that monitoring activities are a function of ownership 
dynamics rather than of a status quo of ownership concentration. Not only full takeovers, but also 
the acquisition of substantial blocks result in substantial policy changes in target firms (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist, 2001).   
 
Hypothesis  6a  (Ownership  dynamics  effect  on  turnover):  Changes  in  ownership  structure 
influence  the  likelihood  of  managerial  turnover:  new  block  holders  with  strong  monitoring 
abilities are more likely to remove the CEO in the wake of poor performance.  
Hypothesis 6b (Ownership dynamics effect on compensation): Changes in ownership structure 
influence the level of the CEO’s cash compensation. The presence of new block holders with 
strong monitoring abilities leads to a stronger pay-for-performance relation. 
    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    9 
   
3. Sample description and methodological approach  
 
3.1. Sample description 
The sample consisting of 250 UK firms is randomly drawn from the population of all 
companies  quoted  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange,  excluding  financial  institutions,  real  estate 
companies and insurance companies. A company is retained if it has at least 3 consecutive years of 
data in the period 1988-1993. A data panel was constructed for this six-year period. Our sample 
period terminates in 1993 when the London Stock Exchange imposed the recommendations for 
good  corporate  governance  of  the  Cadbury  report  on  all  listed  firms.
6  Thus,  our  period  is 
characterized by lower corporate governance standards than more recent years, and is therefore 
particularly interesting to analyze from an agency-theory point of view. Furthermore, turnover and 
pay-for-performance are a particularly interesting study object in recession periods.  
For  a  company  to  be  included  in  the  sample  we  required  that  data  for  at  least  three 
consecutive years within the six years time window are available. Hence, the sample also includes 
those firms that were taken over or went bankrupt. Seven of the 250 companies were dropped 
because accounting data were not available from Datastream.  
 
3.2. Variable definitions, and data description 
All data on managerial compensation. turnover and board composition were retrieved from 
the Directors’ Report and the Notes in the annual reports. In our sample, approximately 11% of 
CEOs  lost their position in a  given  year  (Table 1). The mean and median  logarithm of cash 
compensation  (salary  and  bonus)  was  11.88  and  11.91,  respectively  (which  corresponds  to 
approximately £ 144,000 and £ 149,000). The median age of a CEO is 52 years (with a mean of 
52.6). The median tenure equals 4 years (with a mean of 5.2). Every third CEO also holds the 
position of chairman of the board of directors. The median board consists of 9 directors, 61.5% of 
whom are non-executive directors. Finally, in approximately 26% of the sample firm-years, CEO 
compensation is determined by a remuneration committee
7. The fraction of companies having 
such a committee increases substantially towards the end of the sample period (as documented  
also by Conyon et al., 1995). Turnover data are corrected for natural turnover. We distinguish 
between natural and forced turnover,  classifying a  resignation as ‘natural’ if the  director was 
described  as  having  left  the  board  for  reasons  of  retirement,  death  or  illness.  Otherwise  the 
resignation was classified as being forced. The normal retirement age is between 62 and 65 but 
some voluntary retirement does occur before that; we took 62 as the minimum retirement age and 
viewed any earlier retirement as forced. 
Ownership data both for existing and new shareholders for each year of the period 1988-
1993 were also collected from the Directors’ Report and the Notes in the annual reports. All the 
directors'  holdings greater than 0.1% are recorded as well as other shareholders'  stakes of 5% and 
                                                 
6 For the effect of the Cadbury recommendations on performance and turnover, see Dahya et al. (2002). 
7 The presence of such committees (postulated by Cadbury report) can alter compensation policies and eliminate the 
situation when the remuneration decision is largely influenced by CEOs themselves (Conyon, 1994).    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    10 
   
more and of 3% and above (from 1990 when the statutory disclosure threshold was reduced). The 
status of the directors (executive/non-executive) and the dates of joining and leaving the board 
were also obtained from the annual reports and from contacting the firms directly by phone or fax. 
Non-beneficial share stakes held by the directors on behalf of their families or charitable trusts 
were  added  to  the  directors’  beneficial  holdings.  Although  directors  do  not  obtain  cash  flow 
benefits from these non-beneficial stakes, they usually exercise the voting rights. For equity stakes 
in Nominees accounts, the identity of the shareholders was found by contacting the listed firms 
directly.  In  97%  of  these  cases,  the  shareholders  of  Nominees  accounts  were  institutional 
investors.  
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
  As is typical for Anglo-American firms, the ownership concentration shown in Table 1 is 
relatively low. The median Herfidahl-5 index equals only 0.028 (with a mean of 0.057). Most of 
CEOs do not hold substantial share stakes: the average CEO owns less than 3% of the equity (with 
a median of zero). The median of the combined shareholdings of all executive directors (excluding 
CEO) amounts to less than 1%, with an average of slightly below 8%. Stakes of non-executives 
are lower and do not exceed 4%, on average. The most important class of blockholders consists of 
financial institutions: they hold a (cumulative) median stake of 13% (a mean of 16.6%). Finally, 
other outsiders – individuals, families and industrial firms – control on average 8.2% of equity. 
There  is  also  evidence  of  a  market  in  (small)  blockholdings.  Gross  increases  in  holdings  by 
institutions and by other outsiders amount to 6.4% and 1.8%, respectively, which accounts for half 
and one fourth of the average equity stakes held by those shareholder classes.    
As proxies for stock performance, we employ annual abnormal stock returns (in percentage 
terms), which are collected from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). Abnormal returns are 
calculated  using  the  market  model  and  corrected  for  thin  trading.  The  stocks  of  our  sample 
companies  underperformed  the  benchmark  by  approximately  2.5%  in  year  t  (see  Table  1).  It 
should  be  noted  that  our  time  window  captures  a  recession  period.  We  also  use  alternative 
performance measures like the percentage dividend changes (between years t - 2 and t - 1, and 
between t - 1 and t, respectively), which are collected from Datastream, and employ return on 
assets (earnings before interest and taxes over book value of total assets) as accounting-based 
performance indicators. All accounting data are collected from Datastream and are cross-checked 
with the information from annual reports. We use the logarithm of market-to-book ratio as a proxy 
for  firms’  growth  opportunities  and  as  an  alternative  measure  of  stock  performance.  For  the 
median (average) firm this variable equals 0.51 (0.48).         
In order to control for (potential) size effects, we introduce the logarithm of total assets (in 
£ thousands) at the end of a given year. For the median (mean) company in our sample, this value 
equals to 11.35 (11.26), which corresponds to approximately £ 85 million (£ 78 million). The 
median and mean ratios of capital gearing (defined as long term-debt on total assets) equal 29.72% 
and 32.65%, respectively. Finally, we measure risk by the annual volatility of stock returns, which   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    11 
   
is  gathered  from  the  LSPD.  The  median  and  mean  values  amount  to  34.39%  and  37.43%, 
respectively.  
Some important data were not available for this study. First, non-monetary elements of 
CEO remuneration (in particular stock- and option-grants) are not collected. At best, the annual 
reports  only  mention  that  some  managerial  options  were  outstanding  without  consistently 
revealing  the  number  of  options  outstanding,  the  exercise  price,  and  the  number  of  options 
exercised in the preceding year. Only in the years subsequent to 1995 (when the Greenbury report 
was  issued),  some  of  this  information  became  available.  Second,  the  presence  of  director 
interlocks might affect the level of managerial compensation as well (Hallock, 1997).   
  Our sample period is relatively short but extending the data set beyond 1993 would be 
problematic due to structural differences between pre- and post-Cadbury period.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
  We  employ  a  variety  of  econometric  techniques.  Firstly,  sample  selection  models  are 
applied  to  analyze  jointly  executive  compensation  and  turnover.  Second,  in  order  to  assure 
robustness of conclusions, survival analysis is applied to investigate factors leading to managerial 
turnover. Finally, corporate performance is analyzed within a panel regression framework.   
  We  simultaneously  explain  managerial  turnover  and  compensation  within  a  sample 
selection model framework. The model, often referred to as a type-2 Tobit model, is specified as 
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where { } it it 2 1   ,e e  are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variances 
2
1 s  and 
2
2 s , and covariance  12 s  (Amemiya, 1984). y-variables are quantities of interest while X-variables 
correspond to the explanatory variables. Finally,  1 b  and  2 b  are vectors of the model coefficients. 
It is assumed that only the sign of 
*
1it y  is observed and that 
*
2it y  is observed only when  0
*
1 > i y . 
Moreover, it is assumed that  i X1  are observed for all i, but  i X 2  need not be observed for i such 
that  0
*
1 £ it y . Finally the two sets of explanatory variables, i.e.,  it X1  and  it X 2 , are not disjoint 
(they can differ, however).  
In a standard setting, error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. drawings from a bivariate normal 
distribution. In our models, i corresponds to a firm and t to a year. We relax the assumption of 
independence of e’s across i and allow clustering of observations corresponding to a given firm, 
i.e. we assume error terms to be i.i.d. across firms, but not necessarily for different observations   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    12 
   
within the same firm. All the reported standard errors of estimates are adjusted for clustering 
(StataCorp, 2001). This procedure enhances robustness of our findings and allows us to take the 
panel data structure of our sample explicitly into account. To estimate the type-2 Tobit models, we 
employ a two-step procedure suggested by Heckman (1979), which yields consistent parameter 
estimates.       
  Throughout the paper we call equation (1a) a selection equation, while equation (1b) is 
referred to as a regression equation. The selection equation explains CEO turnover, i.e.,  1 1 = it y  
corresponds to those firm-years when the CEO kept his position. The regression equation explains 
the compensation of such CEOs in the subsequent year. As the notion of compensation sensitivity 
to  previous  year  performance  is  not  meaningful  for  new  CEOs,  we  restrict  the  remuneration 
analysis to CEOs with a tenure of more than one year. Estimating the parameters of the regression 
equation (1b) on the basis of the non-turnover sample only, would not be a valid alternative to the 
proposed method because the OLS estimator of  2 b  is biased when the selection of the regression 
sample  is  endogenous  (i.e.,  0 12 ¹ s ).  Instead,  our  sample  selection  model  deals  with  the 
endogeneity of selection, and therefore renders reliable parameter estimates for the regression 
equation (Greene, 2000).  
 
In order to investigate robustness of the type-2 Tobit models, the determinants of CEO 
turnover are also analyzed with Cox proportional hazard regressions (Cox, 1972; Cox and Oakes, 
1984). The hazard function is defined as  
D
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i t h ,  (4) 
where Ti is the date of dismissal of CEO i. Hence, the hazard function for a given manager can be 
interpreted as the marginal conditional probability of being replaced in the time instant D given 
that he or she was not replaced up to time t. Consequently, a positive parameter estimate for a 
given variable reflects that larger values of this variable increase the probability of CEO dismissal. 
  The basic proportional hazard model looks as follows: 
) ( ) , ( ) ( 0 t h X t h i i × = b y ,  (5) 
where  ) (× i h  is the hazard function for individual i,  ) (× y  is some function of model covariates Xi 
and of parameters b, and  ) ( 0 × h  is the underlying (unspecified) baseline hazard function. Following 
the  literature,  we use for  a log-linear specification, i.e. we  impose the following  form of the 
function y: 
) ’ exp( ) , ( b b y i i X X = .  (6) 
The  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  we  do  not  have  to  parameterize  the  baseline  hazard 
function. Instead, since we are mainly interested in the values of model parameters b, we need to 
maximize only the partial likelihood, which for a given observation is given by:   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    13 
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and does not depend on h0 (Geddes and Vinod, 1997).  
We  allow  the  explanatory  variables  to  be  time-varying,  which  results  in  multiple 
observations  for  each  of  the  analyzed  firms.  In  order  to  assure  robustness  of  the  results,  we 
account for possible dependence between different observations corresponding to the same firm. 
We allow for  clustering and implement  the  procedure, which assumes the observations to  be 
independent  across  firms,  but  does  not  require  different  observations  on  the  same firm  to  be 
independent (StataCorp, 2001). Finally, a robust estimate of the coefficient covariance matrix is 
computed as in Lin and Wei (1989). 
 
Finally,  we  also  employ  panel-data  regression  models  to  examine  the  impact  of  the 
managerial labor market on corporate performance. The basic panel-data regression model looks 
as follows:  
it it i it X y e b a + + = ’ ,  (8) 
where yit  stands for compensation or performance for  company i  in year t. Xit  is a  vector of 
covariates (again for individual i at time t). ai is a firm-specific effect characterizing i-th company, 
b is the vector of model parameters, and eit is an error term
8. 
  Two techniques are frequently used to estimate equation (8): the fixed-effects and random-
effects approaches. In the former, ai’s are treated as model parameters and are hence estimated. 
The random-effect model treats ai’s as the result of a random draw from some distribution (e.g., 
the normal one). For a data panel like ours (relatively large number of firms drawn randomly from 
an even larger population of companies), the use of a random-effects model is recommended 
(Verbeek, 2000), as the number of parameters to be estimated is substantially lower with this 
technique. Furthermore, more efficient estimates are obtained than with fixed-effects models. Still, 
the consistency criterion of such a random-effects approach requires ai’s to be uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables of the model, i.e. the X’s (Baltagi, 1995). Since the Hausman specification 
tests points out that in almost all our specifications this assumption is violated, we report the 
results from the fixed-effects approach. 
 
  In  panel  regressions  explaining  performance,  we  controlled  for  features  characterizing 
ownership structure. Since ownership is often argued to be endogenous with respect to corporate 
performance  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996;  Jensen  et  al,  1992),  it  is  likely  to  result  in 
inconsistency of  fixed-effect  estimators. In order to circumvent  this endogeneity problem, we 
apply  an  instrumental-variable  method  while  estimating  the  performance  regressions.  This 
                                                 
8 In some robustness tests, we also employed panel-data binary choice models (such as random-effect probit and 
fixed-effect  logit).  Since  we  restrict  ourselves  to  brief  discussion  of  the  conclusions,  we  do  not  discuss  that 
methodology here. Extensive treatment of such specifications can be found in Baltagi (1995), Verbeek (2000), and 
Greene (2000).    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    14 
   
instrumental  variable  approach  is  then  embedded  in  the  estimation  of  fixed-effect  panel-data 





In Section 4.1, the sample selection models simultaneously explaining CEO turnover and 
compensation  are  discussed.  Subsequently,  hazard  rate  analyses  of  managerial  survival  are 
presented. Section 4.3 outlines the panel-data models explaining firm performance as a function of 
managerial labor market factors.  
 
4.1. Sample selection models explaining managerial compensation 
 
The results of Panel A of Table 2 support the disciplinary role of managerial turnover 
(Hypothesis  1)  as  performance  is  positively  correlated  to  future  turnover  in  the  selection 
equations. This effect is highly significant for the accounting-based performance measure, but not 
so for stock performance. Managers generating high corporate performance (above the industry 
return on assets) are more likely to keep their position during the subsequent year.  
Strong support for Hypothesis 2 (the rewarding effect of compensation) can be found in 
Panel B of Table 2. In all models, cash compensation, consisting of salary and bonus, is sensitive 
to both past accounting and stock price performance within the 5% (and frequently 1%) level of 
statistical significance.  
 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Strong results are obtained for the relationship between turnover and board characteristics 
(Panel A). Contrary to the US evidence of e.g. Yermack (1996), the presence of larger boards 
facilitates the replacement of the CEO in the UK. It may be that larger boards are a proxy for a 
larger  internal  pool  of  managerial  talent.  Our  findings  also confirm  the  intuition  of  the  1993 
Cadbury report, the ‘Recommendations for Good Corporate Governance’: boards with a larger 
percentage of outside directors replace CEOs more frequently. Still, the interaction terms of the 
proportion  of  non-executive  directors  and  both  performance  measures  (not  shown)
9  are  not 
statistically significant. Boards with a high proportion of non-executive directors do not appear 
significantly more apt to replace underperforming management. Therefore, we cannot support that 
part of Hypothesis 4a referring to the board of directors. Our results do not confirm Weisbach’s 
(1988) findings that outsider-dominated boards, supposedly more independent from management, 
are more able to enforce disciplinary turnover. Finally, when a person fulfills the tasks of CEO 
and chairman of the board simultaneously, the likelihood of his or her replacement is significantly 
                                                 
9 Models with interactive terms of board characteristics and performance are available upon request.    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    15 
   
decreased. This danger of conflicts of interest provides further support for the need to separate the 
positions of CEO and chairman.  
There is no significant relation of board characteristics (including those interacted with 
performance) with the CEO’s cash remuneration with the exception of board size (Panel B of 
Table 2). CEOs of firms with large boards receive a large compensation. Finally, the presence of a 
remuneration committee (consisting of non-executive directors) has a negative impact on CEO 
compensation, which hints that these committees mitigate managerial remuneration although this 
effect is statistically insignificant. We therefore reject that part of Hypothesis 4b which refers to 
the board of directors. 
 
There is no relation between total ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-5 
index, and CEO turnover (Model 2 of Panel A).
10 Also, the interactive terms of total ownership 
concentration  with  performance  are  not  statistically  significant.  Hence,  these  results  reject 
Hypothesis  4a.  Still,  when  we  dissect  ownership  concentration  into  insider  ownership 
concentration (shareholdings controlled by the CEO, other executive directors and non-executive 
directors), we find that strong insider control induces a higher probability that the CEO will not be 
removed  (Model  3).  The  insignificant  interaction  terms  with  accounting  returns  indicate  that 
insiders with large ownership stakes are able to successfully ward off any attempts to replace the 
CEO regardless of accounting performance.
11 The negative interaction term with abnormal returns 
(counter-intuitively) suggests that the CEO with strong voting power is even in a stronger position 
when  the  stock  price  performance  of  his  firm  is  weaker.  Neither  an  analysis  with  outsider 
ownership concentration (Model 3) nor a more detailed analysis with ownership concentration 
held by institutions, families and individuals, other corporations and the government (not shown) 
yields any evidence of outside shareholder monitoring. Thus, we conclude that there is only partial 
support for Hypothesis 5a: CEOs with strong voting power seem immune for substitution (be it 
performance-related or not) and outside  shareholders  do not  seem  to play a role  in replacing 
underperforming management. Lai and Sudarsanam (1998) and Franks et al. (2001) also present 
evidence of managerial entrenchment. We do not find any support that different performance 
criteria are used by different large shareholders to remove the CEO.  
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the stakes (both in simple terms and in interactions) are median-centered: zero corresponds 
to  the  sample  median  (i.e.  2.14%  of  equity  is  controlled  by  insiders  and  22.8%  by  outsiders).  In  models  with 
interaction terms, variable-centering is applied for two reasons: (i) it mitigates collinearity problems; (ii) it results in 
straightforward interpretation of the main-effect coefficient - such a coefficient shows the strength of the relationship 
for a median (or mean) level of the moderating variable (Aiken and West, 1991). 
11  When  we  estimate  the  models  with  ownership  concentration  held  by  the  CEO,  executive  and  non-executive 
directors separately, we find that it is only the CEO’s ownership stake which matters in terms of impeding the CEO’s 
removal. The variables capturing the voting power of the other director classes (and their interaction terms) are not 
significant but have the same sign as the CEO’s ownership concentration. This suggests that little monitoring is 
performed by non-executive directors. This is in line with the findings of Franks et al. (2001) who state that non-
executive  directors  frequently  support  incumbent  management  even  in  the  wake  of  poor  performance.  Poor 
performance is not only the result of poor management but maybe also of poor corporate governance.   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    16 
   
The insights of the tables discussed above are visualized in Figures 1 and 2.
12 Figure 1 
exhibits a considerable weakening of stock-based performance sensitivity for larger insider stakes, 
almost irrespective of the size of outside block holdings. The picture of accounting performance-
sensitivity  of  turnover  (Figure  2)  shows  that  the  sensitivity  also  weakens  for  strong  insider 
ownership. In the low range of insider ownership, the sensitivity increases with the insiders’ stake, 
but it starts to decrease after passing a (relatively low) threshold of about 7% of equity. Figure 2 
shows also that turnover sensitivity with respect to performance varies considerably and non-
monotonically across different levels of outside ownership concentration.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
In the remuneration regression equation (Panel B), we find that when insiders hold large 
share stakes, the CEO’s monetary remuneration is lower. It may be that CEOs deriving substantial 
wealth from their equity investment in their corporation, may care less about their cash income. 
Still, when the firm’s stock performance is low and the wealth of a CEO with a large ownership 
stake decreases
13, the CEO is paid a high level of cash compensation. Thus, CEOs receive high 
monetary compensation in the  wake of  poor stock  performance  provided  that they have high 
voting power. It seems that managerial entrenchment not only eliminates the disciplining of poorly 
performing management but also introduces a pernicious remuneration incentive scheme. When 
outside shareholders hold large stakes, the monetary compensation of the CEO is lower, but as the 
interactive  terms  are  not  significant,  there  is  no  evidence  that  CEO  remuneration  is  more 
performance-related in outsider-dominated firms than in widely-held firms.
14 Thus, we conclude 
that we only find partial evidence supporting Hypothesis 5b: (i) in firms with median (i.e., very 
low)  insider  and  median  outsider  ownership  concentration,  both  accounting  and  stock  price 
performance are positively related to CEO compensation, (ii) in firms with strong insider voting 
power the CEOs remuneration is lower except when the stock price performance is poor and (iii) 
in firms with strong outside shareholders, CEO compensation is lower but outside shareholder do 
not  impose  a  stricter  performance-related  incentive  remuneration  scheme.  Figures  3  and  4 
illustrate performance sensitivity of the CEO’s monetary compensation. Figure 3 confirms that 
substantial inside ownership considerably weakens the pay-for-stock-performance relationship for 
virtually  all  levels  of  outside  block  holdings.  The  (non-monotonic)  impact  of  outside  block 
holdings is most outspoken at the low range of insider ownership. Figure 4 reveals that positive 
remuneration-sensitivity of accounting performance is the strongest in companies with moderate 
sizes of inside and outside block holdings. This positive effect is significant for a broad range of 
                                                 
12 The calculation of conditional z-statistics is explained in the appendix.  
13 See the interactive term of abnormal return with insider ownership in model 3 (panel B of table II). 
14 An analysis of the different types of outside blockholders does not give any significant results apart from the fact 
that in firms with high ownership concentration held by institutions, the CEOs compensation is lower. This effect is 
not performance-related.   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    17 
   
ownership concentrations, although the presence of large insider-controlled blocks obliterates the 
sensitivity of CEO compensation. 
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Finally, we show that the ownership dynamics are not a relevant determinant of CEO 
turnover (Hypothesis 6a) in Model 4 of Panel A. Contrary to what was postulated in Hypothesis 
6b, ownership changes do not influence CEO pay (Model 4 of Panel B).  
 
Table 2 also provides some interesting insights concerning  the  impact of firm-specific 
control variables (size, gearing and risk) on CEO remuneration (Panel B). In line with the UK 
remuneration literature, CEOs of larger firms enjoy significantly higher industry-adjusted cash 
compensation.  Top  management  usually  tries  to  justify  –  rightly  so  or  not  –  size-related 
compensation by the fact that to manage larger firms, more managerial skills are needed which are 
in short supply. We also document that firm leverage has no impact on compensation.  
Our  results  show  that  CEO  remuneration  increases  with  corporate  risk.  Aggarwal  and 
Samwick (1999) and Jin (2002) argue, however, that in an agency framework, managerial risk 
aversion implies that firm risk moderates performance sensitivity of executive compensation. We 
verified  this  claim  and  expanded  our  models  with  interaction  terms  of  company  risk  and 
performance  (tables  available  upon  request).  None  of  these  interaction  terms  are  statistically 
significant which fails to corroborate the hypotheses in the above studies. 
 
As reported in Panel C, the estimate of the correlation coefficient of the error terms in the 
selection and the regression equations is highly significant (Models 1-3). This result confirms that 
the analysis of compensation performance-sensitivity in the simple OLS regression framework 
(based on a censored sample only) is likely to suffer from a severe selection bias (see Section 3.3 
above). The methodology applied in this paper allows us to argue that the strong rewarding effect 




4.2. Hazard rate analysis on CEO survival. 
  Survival analysis allows us to investigate the determinants of managerial replacement and 
the robustness of our conclusions from the simultaneous estimation of previous section. Using a 
series of Cox regression models, we find that strong support for Hypothesis 1 in Table 3. Previous 
year’s poor accounting performance (measured by industry-adjusted ROA) significantly increases 
the likelihood of CEO removal. Although, in some of the models, past stock market performance 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that all results discussed above remain valid for a model which includes interactive terms of 
ownership (model 3), changes in ownership (model 4) and board characteristics simultaneously.   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    18 
   
is marginally significant, it is accounting- rather than market-based performance measures that are 
the dominating criterion for replacing a CEO (Models 5-8).
16  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Significant  results,  in  line  with  those  reported  in  Section  4.1,  are  obtained  for  the 
relationship between turnover and board characteristics. Large boards and boards with a high 
proportion of outside directors facilitate the removal of CEOs. Still the interactive term of the 
proportion of non-executive directors with performance is not significant which implies that non-
executive directors who are more independent from management are not more able to discipline 
underperforming  management.
17  When  the  CEO  dominates  the  board  by  also  holding  the 
chairmanship, he is more likely to ‘survive’ longer.  
Whereas total ownership concentration does not seem to influence the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal (Model 6), Model 7 shows that the presence of specific types of blockholders determines 
the  (non-natural)  CEO  dismissal.  In  companies  where  insiders  hold  larger  fraction  of  equity, 
entrenchment  is  more  likely, especially  when  the company  generates  losses.  A more  detailed 
analysis of insider ownership concentration – more specifically of that of the CEO, executive and 
non-executive directors – reveals that the CEO’s stake and its interaction terms are statistically 
significant. CEOs holding a large proportion of voting rights can make themselves to some extent 
immune to dismissal.
18  
Model 8 analyses the impact of ownership structure on managerial turnover from another 
angle,  namely  that  of  ownership  dynamics  rather  than  that  of  block  holdings.  As  before,  the 
ownership dynamics are not related to CEO turnover. 
The annual volatility of stock returns, our proxy for firm risk, is always significant with a 
positive sign, implying that top executives of high-risk firms are more vulnerable to dismissal. 
Finally, the other control variables (leverage and firm size) are insignificant in all the Cox models 
explaining CEO turnover. 
 
4.3. Performance panel regressions 
  To test Hypothesis 3, we estimated both accounting and stock performance models. The 
results for the industry-adjusted ROA models are reported in Table 4. With respect to the stock 
performance,  we  have  used  abnormal  stock  returns  but  did  not  obtain  any  significant  or 
economically  meaningful  results.  Subsequently,  we  employed  a  proxy  for  Tobin' s  Q  as  our 
measure of stock-based performance (Table 5) and yearly dividend changes (Section 5.3).  
                                                 
16 All turnover figures in these models are corrected for natural turnover. We distinguish between natural and forced 
turnover, classifying a resignation as ‘natural’ if the director was described as having left the board for reasons of 
retirement, death or illness. Otherwise the resignation was classified as being forced. The normal retirement age is 
between 62 and 65 but some voluntary retirement does occur before that; we took 62 as the minimum retirement age 
and viewed any earlier retirement as forced. 
17 The results from the models with board interactive terms are available upon request.  
18 The results from this model are available upon request.    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    19 
   
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
  The results from Tables 4 and 5 strongly support Hypothesis 3: the incentive effect is 
statistically significant in most models.
19 CEOs with a higher level of monetary compensation 
attain better subsequent corporate performance. These results hold for both accounting- and stock-
based measures and are not altered by inclusion of the ownership variables. 
We  also  correct  for  recent  CEO  replacement  and  we  find  no  significant  short-run 
improvement of corporate performance following the (non-natural) CEO replacement. This may 
result from the ’big bath’ logic (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) that states that in the year(s) 
subsequent to CEO removal, there is a substantial increase in the amounts expensed. The reason is 
that in his first (few) year(s), the CEO can still blame the predecessor’s strategy and also attempts 
to lower the performance benchmark such that performance improvements can be more easily 
attained in subsequent years. 
  Ownership  structure  is  often  argued  to  be  endogenous  with  respect  to  performance. 
Therefore,  in Models  10a-12a and 10b-12b  of Tables 4  and 5  we employed  an instrumental-
variable estimation technique rather than simple panel regression.
20 Both Models 10a and 10b 
confirm  that  total  ownership  concentration  is  insignificant  as  a  determinant  of  corporate 
performance. Still, distinguishing between insider and outsider ownership concentration in Model 
11a shows that the presence of large outside shareholders is correlated to higher future accounting 
earnings. A more detailed analysis of the type of outside blockholder reveals that this is due to the 
presence  of  financial  institutions.
21  This  is  somehow  surprising  as  institutions  tend  not  to  be 
involved in managerial decision making. The reason is that they may not have the resources to 
monitor every single firms they invest in and they may wish not to receive inside information such 
that the liquidity of their portfolio investments is not reduced. The fact that institutions are passive 
shareholders is also reflected in the fact that a government committee (the Newbold committee) 
came up with recommendations to stimulate the exertion of voting rights by institutions in 1999 
(Stapledon and Bates, 2002). Whereas the impact of institutional ownership is positive in Model 
11a, that of increases of institutional ownership is negative in Model 12a. We do not find any 
impact of ownership on our stock performance measures. The results also reveal that larger firms 
                                                 
19 Hayes and Schaefer (2000) propose an alternative explanation of this finding. They argue that implicit incentive 
contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. If corporate 
boards optimally use both observable and unobservable (to outsiders) indicators of executive performance and if the 
unobservable  measures  are  correlated  with  future  firm  performance,  then  unexplained  variation  in  current 
compensation could predict future variation in firm performance.  
20 In order to circumvent this endogeneity problem in models 10a and 10b, the ownership concentration measure is 
instrumented by its lagged values. A similar procedure (i.e. using lagged values as instruments) was applied in models 
11a and 11b. However, in models 12a and 12b lagged changes in ownership have two disadvantages. First, the use of 
such  instrument  causes  the  loss  of  one  panel  wave.  Second,  lagged  ownership  changes  are  not  good  potential 
instruments, as their correlation with the variables that are to be instrumented is low. To overcome both problems, in 
models 12a and 12b we use the same set of instruments as in models 11a and 11b. 
21 Tables available upon request   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    20 
   
generate higher returns on assets (Table 4) but are performing worse in terms of stock market 
performance proxied by Tobin’s Q (Table 5). Whereas high gearing and its tax shield is reflected 
in higher stock performance (Table 5), it depresses accounting returns (Table 4). Finally, high risk 
is reflected in neither higher stock market nor accounting performance.  
 
 
5. Robustness tests 
 
5.1. Alternative variable specifications in the simultaneous equations estimation. 
5.1.1. Remuneration 
We re-estimated the Models of Section 4.1 using the logarithm of CEO compensation 
rather than the logarithm of industry-adjusted CEO pay as a dependent variable in the regression 
equation. Such specifications failed to explain managerial remuneration, even after the inclusion 
of industry dummies to control for industry-specific effects. Therefore, we argue that Hypothesis 2 
only holds for the appropriate measure of compensation. The lack of performance sensitivity of 
compensation found in the UK compensation literature (compare Conyon et al., 1995) may be 
attributable to the different variable specifications.  
 
5.1.2. Corporate performance 
  We  substituted  unadjusted  ROA  and  (yearly)  changes  in  EBIT  for  our  accounting 
performance  measure  and  obtained  similar  results  both  in  the  regression  and  the  selection 
equation.  For  two  other  proxies  tried  (adjusted  and  unadjusted  ROE),  the  relation  with  CEO 
turnover  and  industry-adjusted  compensation  not  significant.  An  alternative  measure  of  stock 
performance (dividend changes as a signal of future value) gave results similar to those obtained 
with stock returns. Tobin' s Q correlates positively with remuneration in the regression equations, 
but is not a used as a benchmark to remove the CEO (selection equation). 
Finally,  we  extended  the  models  by  also  including  two-year  lags  of  the  performance 
indicators. In most of the specifications, both accounting- and market-based proxies lagged two 
years  appeared  insignificant.  Thus,  it  seems  that  the  decisions  to  CEO  removal  as  well  as 
remuneration are taken swiftly, once poor or good performance thresholds are reached. 
 
5.1.3. Ownership and control 
In the selection equations, the variables measuring total ownership concentration mostly 
turn out to be insignificant, irrespectively of the proxy tried. Only when we employ a Shapley 
value of the largest block holder, which captures the relative voting power of this blockholder, we 
obtain a positive correlation (at the 10% level) with the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Hypothesis 
4a). In relation to the tests of Hypothesis 5a and b, we tried alternative proxies to measure stakes 
and  voting  power  of  different  types  of  owners  (e.g.  the  largest  stake  in  each  of  the  classes, 
Herfindahl-3 concentration indices within each shareholder class, the largest Shapley value for the 
largest blockholder by shareholder classes, the Shapley values by class of owner). The results are   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    21 
   
in  line  with  those  reported  in  Section  4.1:  we  only  find  consistent  support  for  managerial 
entrenchment as larger stakes controlled by insider (mainly the CEO) mitigate the likelihood of 
CEO dismissal.  
With respect to the regression equations, our results appear robust to different proxies of 
ownership  structure:  total  ownership  concentration  has  not  impact  on  the  level  of  CEO 
compensation.  Thus,  Hypothesis  4b  can  be  rejected.  Replacing  cumulative  stakes  of  various 
classes of owners by the largest block in each of the groups, by Shapley values of the largest 
investor in each of the owner-type classes, by Herfidahl-3 indices for different groups, or by class 
Shapley values produces results that are comparable to those reported earlier in Section 4.1.   
 
5.1.4. Leverage 
The results are also robust to the choice of leverage proxy (using book or market value) as 
none  of  the  conclusions  concerning  the  research  hypotheses  is  challenged  in  alternative 
specifications.  Also  extending  model  specifications  by  adding  additional  firm-specific  control 
variables capturing changes in capital structure (such as dummy variable for firms issuing new 
equity) does not materially affect the results.  
 
5.1.5. Model extensions by CEO age 
Several studies argue that CEO age is one of the crucial determinants of compensation and 
of turnover. We extended the models by including CEO age but did not do so in the models of 
Table 2 because CEO age variable is only available for 60% of our the sample. CEO age has no 
impact on the CEO replacement but is positively related to CEO cash compensation (at the 10% of 
statistical significance). None of the other results presented in Table 2 are rejected.  
 
5.2. Robustness tests for hazard models 
In spite of the advantages of the methodology applied in Section 4.2 - more specifically the 
fact that we do not need a full parameterization of the hazard function - we estimate panel-data 
fixed-effect  logit  models  to  verify  robustness  further.  Due  to  the  requirements  of  estimation 
procedure  (i.e.,  conditional  maximum  likelihood)  sample  size  was  shrunk  substantially  (by 
approximately 60%), which brings about lower levels of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the 
major qualitative conjectures concerning CEO turnover are upheld irrespectively of the choice of 
methodology.  
Next, we re-estimated Cox models of Section 4.2 using alternative proxies for stock price 
performance  (yearly  dividend  changes,  Tobin’s  Q  proxy),  for  accounting-based  performance 
(unadjusted ROA and changes in EBIT), for ownership concentration (Herfindahl-10 index, the 
largest block holding, Herfidahl-3 indices for each shareholder class and Shapley values of the 
largest shareholder of each class), for leverage (book- or market-based) and generated results that 
hardly differ from those presented in Table 3. Two-year lags of the performance variables were 
insignificant. Franks et al. (2001) state that new equity issues present the ideal opportunity to   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    22 
   
replace poorly performing CEOs, but we find no evidence that the dummy variable capturing the 
fact that a new equity issue took place, is correlated with CEO replacement.  
   
5.3. Robustness tests for performance panel regressions 
In Section 4.3, we discussed the impact of CEO remuneration and replacement on future 
industry-adjusted ROA. Models with unadjusted ROA and with changes in EBIT did equally well 
as  those  shown  in  Table  4.  The  models  explaining  changes  in  EBIT  yielded  an  additional 
interesting result: in the year subsequent to a CEO’s dismissal, the new CEO tends to increase the 
EBIT significantly (which does not happen for other accounting or stock market measures). We 
also re-estimated the models of Table 5 with the dependent variable being yearly dividend changes 
(instead of the Tobin’s Q proxy) and obtain robust results.   
In both series of models (in Tables 4 and 5), we replaced industry-adjusted lagged CEO 
compensation by logarithm of lagged compensation (without industry adjustments) but failed to 
find  support  for  the  incentive  effect.  This  result  also  advocates  that  the  relevant  measure  of 
managerial pay is industry-adjusted: CEOs with salaries that exceed those of their industry peers 
seem  more  incentivized.  Including  the  alternative  ownership  measures  and  control  variables 
(leverage, size, risk), described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, into the models of Tables 4 and 5 yields 
robust results. Including a dummy variable for companies issuing new equity does not alter any of 
the  conclusions.  As  expected,  the  new  equity  issue  dummy  is  statistically  and  positively 
significant in models with growth opportunities as dependent variable.    
 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this paper we simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market: 
CEO turnover and monetary remuneration schemes. Sample selection models and hazard analyses 
applied to a random sample of 250 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over a six-year pre-
Cadbury period show that managerial remuneration and the termination of labor contracts play an 
important role in mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders. We find that 
both  the  CEOs’  industry-adjusted  monetary  compensation  and  their  replacement  are  strongly 
performance-sensitive. Top executive turnover is shown to serve as a disciplinary mechanism for 
corporate  underperformance,  whereas  the  level  of  monetary  compensation  rewards  good 
performance. Past UK literature uncovers little evidence of performance-sensitivity which may be 
the  result  of  biases  in  estimation  techniques  as  well  as  the  incorrect  choice  of  remuneration 
measures  and  performance  benchmarks.  We  find  that  CEO  turnover  has  the  strongest 
performance-sensitivity for industry-corrected accounting measures and less strong a relation with 
stock performance measures. This suggests that CEOs are only dismissed at a rather late stage, 
namely  when  poor  performance  is  reflected  in  the  accounting  returns.  The  CEO’s  monetary 
remuneration  reflects  both  past  good  accounting  performance  and  stock  price  performance   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    23 
   
(abnormal returns, Tobin’s Q and dividend increases). As such we document both the disciplinary 
effect of turnover and the rewarding effect of monetary compensation. 
 
We also investigate whether specific corporate governance mechanisms (different types of 
blockholders, of boards of directors or of leverage) have an impact on managerial disciplining or 
on  pay-for-performance  contracts.  We  find  that  neither  total  ownership  concentration  nor  the 
presence of large blockholdings held by outsider shareholders (institutions, families or individuals, 
other corporations) leads to higher CEO turnover even in the wake of poor performance. This 
implies  that  there  is  little  evidence  of  shareholder  monitoring.  Still,  there  is  one  type  of 
blockholder  that  impedes  CEO  dismissal:  CEOs  with  strong  voting  power  successfully  resist 
replacement irrespective of corporate performance. This case of strong managerial entrenchment 
is even exacerbated when the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board.  Boards with 
a high proportion of non-executive directors replace the CEO more frequently, but these boards 
are not more apt to replace underperforming management. There is also little consistent evidence 
that the market in large ownership stakes and leverage influence CEO turnover. 
 
We find that CEO monetary compensation is not only related to corporate size and risk but 
is also positively related to both accounting and stock price performance in firms with low insider 
and median outsider ownership concentration. In firms with large outside shareholdings, CEO 
compensation  is  lower  but  outside  shareholder  do  not  impose  a  stricter  performance-related 
incentive remuneration scheme. When insiders have strong voting power, the CEOs remuneration 
is lower except when the stock price performance is poor. This suggests that when the CEOs 
wealth resulting from an investment in their own company goes down due to decreasing stock 
prices, the CEOs cash compensation is set at a higher level. The presence of a remuneration 
committee has no impact on remuneration.  
 
Finally,  we  analyze  the  impact  of  CEO  replacement  on  future  performance  and  the 
incentive effects of monetary compensation. Following CEO dismissal, there is little evidence of 
short-run improvement of corporate performance. This may be the consequence of the fact that 
incoming CEOs increase the amounts expensed. In their first (few) year(s), CEOs can still blame 
their predecessor’s strategy and may also attempt to lower the benchmark such that performance 
improvements will be easily attained in subsequent years. In contrast, we find strong support for 
the  incentive  effect-hypothesis  of  remuneration:  CEOs  with  higher  levels  of  monetary 
compensation  (salary  and  bonus)  attain  better  subsequent  accounting  and  stock  price-based 
measures of corporate performance.    Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    24 
   
Appendix 
 
The conditional z-statistics illustrated by Figures 1-4 were calculated as follows. Consider 
a given model equation of the form: 
 
, 5 4
3 2 1 0
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where y is a dependent variable;  5 1 0 , , , b b b   and a vector B are model parameters; Perfi is the 
analyzed performance indicator; InsOwni and OutOwni are (median-centered) stakes controlled by 
insiders and outsiders, respectively; Xi is a vector containing other regressors; and ei is an error 
term. The conditional estimate of the effect of performance variable on y in such a model can be 
expressed as: 
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where ^ denote estimates of the parameters.  
The variance of this conditional estimate is given by: 
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Under the null hypothesis (H0: Conditional performance sensitivity = 0), it has an asymptotic 
standard normal distribution (Aiken and West, 1991).  
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics. 
    Median   Mean  Std. deviation 
  CEO turnover 
CEO dismissal  0.000  0.110  0.313 
   
CEO compensation 
Industry-adjusted logarithm of salary  0.000  0.002  0.623 
Logarithm of salary  11.878  11.909  0.687 
   
CEO characteristics 
CEO age  52.000  52.581  6.343 
CEO tenure  4.000  5.151  5.482 
CEO is the board chairman  0.000  0.335  0.472 
   
Board composition 
Fraction of outside directors  61.540  61.411  15.035 
Board size  2.197  2.173  0.372 
Remuneration committee presence  0.000  0.259  0.438 
   
Ownership variables 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index  0.028  0.057  0.084 
CEO stake  0.000  2.983  8.095 
Executives’ stake  0.120  4.572  10.746 
Non-executives’ stake   0.000  3.914  9.625 
Institutions’ stake  13.000  16.596  16.116 
Families/indiv.’s and corporations’ stake  0.000  8.218  14.083 
Increase in executives’ stake  0.000  0.729  3.376 
Increase in non-executives’ stake  0.000  0.513  2.935 
Increase in institutions’ stake  3.100  6.402  8.802 
Increase in fam./indiv./corporations’ stake  0.000  1.842  5.911 
   
Performance indicators (all but the last variable in percentage terms) 
Abnormal stock return in year t  -5.195  -2.506  47.150 
Abnormal stock return in year t-1  -3.710  -2.418  38.173 
Abnormal stock return in year t-2  -1.370  2.063  41.054 
Return on assets in year t  16.315  15.234  26.572 
Return on assets in year t-1  18.100  17.704  20.420 
Return on assets in year t-2  19.590  19.000  20.194 
Growth opportunities (Tobin' s Q proxy)  0.509  0.481  0.772 
   
Firm-specific control variables 
Firm size  11.259  11.349  1.794 
Capital gearing  29.715  32.651  24.784 
Risk  34.390  37.429  13.070 
Note to Table 1: CEO dismissal is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-years in which CEO change took 
place. Logarithm of salary is a natural logarithm of CEO total cash compensation (including bonuses) expressed 
in pounds. Industry-adjusted logarithm of salary is an industry-year median-adjusted logarithm of CEO salary (as 
defined above). CEO age and tenure are measured in years. The last of the CEO characteristics is a dummy 
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outside directors is expressed as a percentage of the total number of directors. The board size is defined as a 
natural logarithm  of the total number of  directors.  The  presence of a remuneration committee is a dummy 
variable equaling one for those firm-years for which a remuneration committee is in place. The Herfindahl-5 
concentration-index  is  calculated  using  the  equity  stakes  of  the  five  largest  shareholders.  The  following 
ownership variables represent cumulative total percentage stakes for the CEO, executive directors, non-executive 
directors, financial institutions, families and individuals, and corporations, respectively (as revealed in company 
reports). The remaining four ownership variables correspond to increases (in percentage points) of cumulative 
stakes  held  by  executives,  non-executives,  financial  institutions,  families  and  individual  shareholders,  and 
corporations. The first three performance indicators are abnormal stock returns (in percentage terms) and their 
values lagged one and two years, respectively. Return on assets (contemporaneous, lagged one and two years) is 
defined as the ratio of EBIT over total assets in a given year. Growth opportunities are proxied by the logarithm 
of the market-to-book ratio of the firm. Firm size is proxied by a natural logarithm of the total book value of 
assets. Capital gearing is defined as the ratio of debt to total assets and expressed in percentage terms. Risk is 
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Table  2.  Sample  selection  models  explaining  CEO  turnover  and  industry-adjusted  cash 
compensation. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Panel A: Selection equations 
 
Dependent variable equals 0 if the CEO is replaced and 1 otherwise. 
  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  4.235  0.000  4.389  0.000  3.835  0.000  4.896  0.000 
   
Performance indicators 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1  0.010  0.001  0.010  0.011  0.011  0.058  0.013  0.001 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1  0.003  0.158  0.003  0.163  0.005  0.032  0.003  0.291 
   
Board composition 
Board size   -0.986  0.000  -0.900  0.000  -0.943  0.000  -0.891  0.003 
Fraction of outside directors  -0.008  0.058  -0.008  0.050  -0.008  0.046  -0.008  0.545 
CEO is also the chairman  0.401  0.006  0.417  0.006  0.405  0.006  0.486  0.299 
   
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size  0.058  0.179  0.032  0.497  0.085  0.128  0.043  0.702 
Capital gearing  0.000  0.909  0.000  0.941  0.000  0.919  0.000  0.949 
Risk  -0.008  0.209  -0.007  0.253  -0.005  0.374  -0.006  0.444 
   
Ownership concentration 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index      -0.448  0.541         
Accounting perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      -0.015  0.784         
Stock Price perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      -0.025  0.309         
Insiders’ blockholdings          0.012  0.042     
Accounting perform. * insider stakes          -0.000  0.638     
Stock Price perform. * insider  stake          -0.000  0.023     
Outside block holdings          -0.004  0.250     
Accounting perform. * outsider stakes          -0.000  0.922     
Stock Price perform. * outsider stakes          0.000  0.944     
   
Ownership dynamics 
Increase in insiders’ blockholdings              0.009  0.789 
Accounting perform. * increase insider stakes              -0.001  0.389 
Stock Price perform. * increase insider stakes              -0.000  0.844 
Increase in outsiders’ blockholdings              0.013  0.229 
Accounting perform. * increase outsider stakes              -0.000  0.432 
Stock Price perform. * increase outsider stakes              0.000  0.429 
   
Year and industry control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald c
2  c
2(23) = 86.05  c
2(26) = 63.69  c
2(29) = 104.78  c
2(29) = 161.24 
P-value for c
2   < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
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Table 2 - continued. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Panel B: Regression equations 
 
Dependent variable is the industry-adjusted CEO cash remuneration 
  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -3.511  0.000  -3.489  0.000  -3.139  0.000  -3.747  0.000 
   
Performance indicators 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1  0.004  0.013  0.004  0.008  0.003  0.059  0.006  0.001 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.025 
   
Board composition 
Board size   0.191  0.023  0.193  0.022  0.189  0.015  0.193  0.154 
Fraction of outside directors  0.002  0.306  0.002  0.327  0.002  0.271  0.001  0.620 
CEO is the board chairman  0.019  0.675  0.025  0.595  0.030  0.525  0.029  0.655 
Remuneration committee presence  -0.009  0.840  -0.013  0.768  -0.019  0.659  -0.043  0.440 
   
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size  0.236  0.000  0.235  0.000  0.208  0.000  0.253  0.000 
Capital gearing  0.001  0.314  0.001  0.383  0.001  0.434  0.000  0.771 
Risk  0.008  0.003  0.008  0.003  0.008  0.009  0.011  0.003 
   
Ownership concentration 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index      -0.325  0.522         
Accounting perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      -0.010  0.580         
Stock Price perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      -0.007  0.089         
Insiders’ blockholdings          -0.005  0.007     
Accounting perform. * insider stakes          0.000  0.329     
Stock Price perform. * insider stakes          -0.000  0.024     
Outside block holdings          -0.003  0.046     
Accounting perform. * outsider stakes          -0.000  0.506     
Stock Price perform. * outsider stakes          0.000  0.942     
   
Ownership dynamics 
Increase in insiders’ blockholdings              -0.000  0.979 
Accounting perform. * increase insider stake              -0.001  0.050 
Stock Price perform. * increase insider stake              -0.000  0.251 
Increase in outsiders’ blockholdings              -0.000  0.863 
Accounting perform.* increase outsider stakes              -0.000  0.253 
Stock Price perform.* increase outsider stakes               -0.000  0.877 
   
Year control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald c
2  c
2(13) = 352.92  c
2(16) = 363.20  c
2(19) = 500.90  c
2(19) = 382.29 
P-value for c
2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table 2 - continued. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Panel C: Model statistics and tests 
       
Total no. of observations  851  840  847  695 
No. of censored observations  102  94  101  87 
No. of uncensored observations  749  746  746  608 
Log-likelihood  -644.21  -630.95  -623.95  -495.23 
Wald c
2 statistics for testing  
joint significance of two equations 
 
c
2(36) = 599.95 
 
c
2(42) = 586.41 
 
c
2(48) = 819.24 
 
c
2(48) = 988.96 
P-value for c
2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Estimate of    -0.508  -0.465  -0.595  -0.882 
Wald c
2 statistics for testing   = 0 




2(1) = 5.95 
 
c
2(1) = 3.50 
 
c
2(1) = 8.21 
 
c
2(1) = 0.21 
P-value for c
2  0.015  0.062  0.004  0.648 
Note to Table 2: The table presents the estimates of the sample selection models for top executive turnover (selection 
equation of Panel A) and CEO industry-adjusted compensation (regression equation of Panel B). Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering of observations on each firm. The dependent binary variable of Panel A equals one for CEOs that 
were not replaced in a given year and zero otherwise. As far as regressors are concerned, industry-adjusted ROA is 
defined as industry-year median adjusted return on equity (in percentage terms) lagged one year. Likewise, abnormal 
stock return is lagged one year. Board size is defined as a natural logarithm of the total number of directors. Fraction of 
outside directors is expressed as a percentage of outsiders on the board. The last of the board characteristics is a dummy 
variable that equals one for CEOs serving at the same time the function of board chairmen. Firm size is proxied by a 
natural logarithm of the total book value of assets. Capital gearing is expressed in percentage terms. Company risk is 
measured as an annual volatility of stock returns. The Herfindahl-5 concentration index is calculated using the stakes of 
the five largest shareholders. The blockholding variables consist of insider stakes (the amalgamation of the shareholdings 
of the CEO, executive and non-executive directors). The outsider blockholdings are the amalgamation of the stakes held 
by financial institutions, families and individuals, the government and corporations, respectively, provided the individual 
stakes are 5% or above. The variables describing ownership dynamics correspond to increases (in percentage points) of 
cumulative stakes held by insider and outsider shareholders. In the regression equations (Panel B) the dependent variable 
is an industry-adjusted CEO cash compensation in the subsequent year. The explanatory variables are defined in the same 
way as in the selection equations. The only difference is that here time-varying regressors are lagged one year less 
compared to those from Panel A. The remuneration committee presence is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-
years, when remuneration committee was in place.   
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Table 3. Hazard analysis of CEO turnover. 
Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Dependent variable is the marginal conditional probability that the CEO is 
replaced in the time instant D given that he was not replaced up to time t. 
 
Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
  Performance indicators 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year t-1  -0.008  0.002  -0.011  0.002  -0.014  0.041  -0.009  0.053 
Abnormal stock returns in year t-1  -0.006  0.082  -0.005  0.132  -0.005  0.178  -0.004  0.354 
   
Board composition 
Board size   1.506  0.000  1.466  0.000  1.562  0.000  1.479  0.000 
Fraction of outside directors  0.013  0.026  0.013  0.041  0.012  0.050  0.015  0.020 
CEO is the board chairman  -1.073  0.000  -1.058  0.000  -1.036  0.000  -1.087  0.000 
   
Firm size, leverage, and risk 
Firm size  -0.088  0.238  -0.096  0.218  -0.142  0.089  -0.060  0.435 
Capital gearing  0.003  0.400  0.003  0.455  0.003  0.453  0.003  0.417 
Risk  0.019  0.024  0.017  0.050  0.014  0.117  0.019  0.032 
   
Ownership concentration 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index      0.930  0.438         
Accounting perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      0.096  0.105         
Stock Price perform. * Herfindahl-5 index      0.000  0.988         
Insiders’ blockholdings          -0.013  0.153     
Accounting perform. * insider stakes          0.000  0.094     
Stock Price perform. * insider stakes          -0.000  0.870     
Outside block holdings          0.008  0.188     
Accounting perform. * outsider stakes          0.000  0.351     
Stock Price perform. * outsider stakes          -0.000  0.888     
   
Ownership dynamics 
Increase in insiders’ blockholdings              0.021  0.205 
Accounting perform. * increase insider stake              0.000  0.858 
Stock Price perform. * increase insider stake              0.000  0.630 
Increase in outsiders’ blockholdings              0.009  0.385 
Accounting perform.* increase outsider stakes              0.000  0.594 
Stock Price perform.* increase outsider stakes               -0.000  0.306 
   
Year and industry control variables 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-likelihood  -450.25  -440.56  -437.63  -437.91 
Wald test c
2  c
2(23) = 168.75  c
2(26) = 166.36  c
2(29) = 188.33  c
2(29) = 199.57 
P-value for c
2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Pseudo-R
2  0.089  0.086  0.092  0.084 
No. of observations  1148  1136  1136  955 
Note to Table 3: The table presents the estimates of the Cox proportional hazard rate model for managerial tenure. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering of observations on each firm. Industry-adjusted ROA is defined as industry-year median 
adjusted return on equity (in percentage terms) lagged by one year. Abnormal stock return is lagged by one year as well. Board 
size is defined as a natural logarithm of the total number of directors. The fraction of outside directors is expressed as a 
percentage of outsiders on the board. ‘CEO is board chairman’ is a dummy variable that equals one for CEOs serving at the 
same time as chairman of the board. Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of the total book value of assets. Capital   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    34 
   
gearing is expressed in percentage terms. Company risk is measured as an annual volatility of stock returns. Herfindahl-5 
concentration index is based on stakes of the five largest shareholders. The blockholding measures represent cumulative total 
percentage stakes held by insiders (CEO, executive directors, non-executive directors) and outsiders (financial institutions, 
families  and  individuals,  and  corporations).  The  variables  describing  ownership  dynamics  correspond  to  increases  (in 
percentage  points)  of  cumulative  stakes  held  by  insiders  (CEOs,  executives,  non-executives)  and  outsiders  (financial 
institutions, families and individuals, and corporations).   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    35 
   
Table 4. Fixed-effect panel regressions explaining industry-adjusted corporate performance 
(ROA). 
  Model 9a  Model 10a  Model 11a  Model 12a 




Fixed effects with 
IV 
  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  -49.969  0.141  -63.275  0.128  -85.272  0.038  -30.550  0.446 
   
CEO compensation and turnover 
Industry-adjusted logarithm of salary   7.371  0.031  9.764  0.058  6.428  0.094  8.688  0.029 
CEO dismissal (lagged)  -2.422  0.371  -2.218  0.457  -2.497  0.404  -0.794  0.806 
   
Board composition 
Board size   -9.529  0.101  -10.851  0.110  -9.943  0.124  -3.371  0.651 
Fraction of outside directors  -0.092  0.410  -0.132  0.320  -0.010  0.939  -0.161  0.224 
   
Firm-specific control variables 
Capital gearing  -0.191  0.001  -0.198  0.002  -0.189  0.003  -0.222  0.001 
Firm size  10.398  0.000  10.830  0.000  11.414  0.000  8.814  0.003 
Risk  -0.972  0.000  -0.926  0.000  -0.948  0.000  -1.083  0.000 
   
Ownership concentration 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index      241.965  0.524         
Insiders’ blockholdings          0.198  0.744     
Outsiders’ blockholdings          0.925  0.008     
   
Ownership dynamics 
Increase in insiders’ blockholdings              -0.154  0.900 
Increase in outsiders’ blockholdings              -1.230  0.004 
  Other control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
su  26.522  29.119  26.103  29.757 
se  20.352  21.818  22.325  23.659 
r  0.629  0.640  0.578  0.613 
F-test for all ui = 0  F(216,653) = 2.20  F(215,646) = 1.92  F(214,645) = 1.87  F(215,650) = 1.67 
P-value for F  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Corr(ui, Xb)  -0.746  -0.762  -0.681  -0.750 
Model F-test or c
2 test  F(11,653) = 11.38  c
2(12) = 109.79  c
2(13) = 113.95  c
2(13) = 102.13 
P-value for F or c
2   < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
R
2 - within  0.161  0.046  0.001  0.000 
R
2 - between  0.075  0.042  0.045  0.069 
R
2 - overall  0.071  0.046  0.053  0.060 
No. of groups  217  216  216  216 
No. of observations  881  874  874  879 
Note to Table 4: Model 9a estimates are obtained from standard fixed-effect panel regression approach. Models 10a-12a apply 
instrumental  variable  estimation  technique  within  a  context  of  fixed-effect  panel  regression.  In  Model  10a,  Herfindahl-5 
concentration  index  was  instrumented  with  its  lagged  variable  and  all  the  other  regressors.  In  Model  11a,  ownership 
concentration variables were instrumented by their lagged values and other regressors of the model. In Model 12a, ownership 
dynamics indicators were instrumented by ownership concentration proxies (stakes held by CEO, executives, non-executives, 
financial  institutions,  and  families  and  individuals,  and  corporations  outsiders)  and  other  regressors  of  the  model.  The 
dependent variable in all four models is the industry-year median adjusted return on assets (in percentage terms). Industry-
adjusted logarithm of salary is an industry-year median-adjusted logarithm of CEO cash compensation. Lagged CEO dismissal   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    36 
   
is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-years in which CEO change took place during the previous year. The board size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors. The fraction of outside directors is expressed as a percentage 
of outsiders in the board. Capital gearing is expressed in percentage terms. Firm investment opportunities are proxied by the 
logarithm of the book value of assets. Firm size stands for the natural logarithm of the total book value of assets. Company risk 
is  proxied  by  annual  volatility  of  stock  returns.  Herfindahl-5  concentration  index  is  based  on  stakes  of  the  five  largest 
shareholders. The blockholding measures represent cumulative total percentage stakes for insiders (CEO, executive directors, 
non-executive  directors)  and  outsiders  (financial  institutions,  families  and  individuals,  and  corporations).  The  variables 
describing ownership dynamics correspond to increases (in percentage points) of cumulative stakes held by insiders (CEOs, 
executives, non-executives) and outsiders (financial institutions, families and individuals, and corporations). 
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Table 5. Fixed-effect panel regressions explaining stock performance. 
  Model 9b  Model 10b  Model 11b  Model 12b 






  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  4.448  0.000  4.345  0.000  4.152  0.000  4.538  0.000 
   
CEO compensation and turnover 
Industry-adjusted logarithm of salary   0.166  0.009  0.178  0.051  0.161  0.015  0.175  0.008 
CEO dismissal (lagged)  0.026  0.610  0.026  0.622  0.025  0.627  0.034  0.525 
   
Board composition 
Board size   -0.178  0.103  -0.174  0.149  -0.172  0.124  -0.126  0.312 
Fraction of outside directors  0.0004  0.837  0.0003  0.886  0.001  0.637  0.000  0.991 
   
Firm-specific control variables 
Capital gearing  0.003  0.019  0.003  0.025  0.003  0.020  0.002  0.047 
Firm size  -0.270  0.000  -0.267  0.000  -0.262  0.000  -0.278  0.000 
Risk  -0.015  0.000  -0.014  0.000  -0.014  0.000  -0.015  0.000 
   
Ownership concentration 
Herfindahl-5 concentration index      1.333  0.843         
Insiders’ blockholdings          0.003  0.771     
Outsiders’ blockholdings          0.006  0.292     
   
Ownership dynamics 
Increase in insiders’ blockholdings              -0.005  0.812 
Increase in outsiders’ blockholdings              -0.008  0.258 
   
Other control variables 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
su  0.784  0.809  0.828  0.777 
se  0.381  0.385  0.385  0.395 
r  0.809  0.815  0.822  0.795 
F-test for all ui = 0  F(216,651) = 11.33 F(215,644) = 10.97 F(215,643) = 10.60 F(215,648) = 10.34 
P-value for F  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Corr(ui, Xb)  -0.370  -0.420  -0.458  -0.340 
Model F-test or c
2 test  F(11,651) = 12.21  c
2(12) = 1479.29  c
2(13) = 1481.05  c
2(13) = 
P-value for F or c
2  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
R
2 - within  0.171  0.161  0.162  0.114 
R
2 - between  0.010  0.003  0.002  0.012 
R
2 - overall  0.027  0.016  0.011  0.029 
No. of groups  879  872  872  877 
No. of observations  217  216  216  216 
Note to Table 5: Model 9b estimates are obtained from standard fixed-effect panel regression approach. Models 10b-12b apply 
instrumental  variable  estimation  technique  within  a  context  of  fixed-effect  panel  regression.  In  Model  10b,  Herfindahl-5 
concentration  index  was  instrumented  with  its  lagged  variable  and  all  the  other  regressors.  In  Model  11b,  ownership 
concentration variables were instrumented by their lagged values and other regressors of the model. In Model 12b, ownership 
dynamics indicators were instrumented by ownership concentration proxies (stakes held by insiders and outsiders) and other 
regressors of the model. 
The dependent variable in all four models is the logarithm of the ratio of market- and book-value of the firm. Industry-
adjusted logarithm of salary is the industry-year median-adjusted logarithm of CEO cash compensation. Lagged CEO dismissal 
is a dummy variable that equals one for firm-years in which CEO change took place during the previous year. Board size is   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    38 
   
defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors. The fraction of outside directors is expressed as a percentage of 
outsiders in the board. Capital gearing is expressed in percentage terms. Firm investment opportunities are proxied by the 
logarithm of the book value of assets. Firm size is defined as the natural logarithm of the total book value of assets. Company 
risk is proxied by annual volatility of stock returns. The Herfindahl-5 concentration index is based on stakes of the five largest 
shareholders. The blockholding measures represent cumulative total percentage stakes for insiders (CEO, executive directors, 
non-executive  directors)  and  outsiders  (financial  institutions,  families  and  individuals,  and  corporations).  The  variables 
describing ownership dynamics correspond to increases (in percentage points) of cumulative stakes held by insiders (CEOs, 
executives, non-executives) and outsiders (financial institutions, families and individuals, and corporations). 
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Figure 1. Significance of CEO turnover sensitivity with respect to the stock price-based corporate 
performance for various levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Note: Values of the magnitude exceeding 1.96 are significant at 5% level (2-tail test). 
 
 
Figure 2. Significance of CEO turnover sensitivity with respect to the accounting-based corporate 
performance for various levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Note: Values of the magnitude exceeding 1.96 are significant at 5% level (2-tail test).   Managerial labor market and shareholder control structures    40 
   
Figure 3. Significance of CEO monetary compensation-sensitivity with respect to the stock price-
based corporate performance for various levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Note: Values of the magnitude exceeding 1.96 are significant at 5% level (2-tail test). 
 
 
Figure 4. Significance of CEO monetary compensation-sensitivity with respect to the accounting-
based corporate performance for various levels of ownership concentration. 
 
Note: Values of the magnitude exceeding 1.96 are significant at 5% level (2-tail test). 
 